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Abstract
We propose a straightforward technique to provide peer-to-peer security in mobile networks. We show that far
from being a hurdle, mobility can be exploited to set up security associations among users. We leverage on the
temporary vicinity of users, during which appropriate cryptographic protocols are run. We illustrate the operation
of the solution in two scenarios, both in the framework of mobile ad hoc networks. In the first scenario, we assume
the presence of an off-line certification authority and we show how mobility helps to set up security associations
for secure routing; in this case, the security protocol runs over one-hop radio links. We further show that mobility
can be used for the periodic renewal of vital security information (e.g., the distribution of hash chain/Merkle tree
roots). In the second scenario, we consider fully self-organized security: users authenticate each other by visual
contact and by the activation of an appropriate secure side channel of their personal device; we show that the
process can be fuelled by taking advantage of trusted acquaintances. We then show that the proposed solution
is generic: it can be deployed on any mobile network and it can be implemented either with symmetric or with
asymmetric cryptography. We provide a performance analysis by studying the behavior of the solution in various
scenarios.
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21 INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer security is considered to be more difficult to achieve than traditional security based on
central servers. One would expect the problem to become even more challenging when users are allowed
to move around and to be connected only sporadically. Indeed, according to common belief, wireless
communication and mobility are at odds with security: jamming or eavesdropping is easier on a wireless
link than on a wired one, notably because such mischief can be perpetrated without physical access or
contact; likewise, a mobile device is more vulnerable to impersonation and to denial of service attacks.
The security architectures of existing mobile networks are highly centralized (as are their static, wireline
counterparts). For example, the security of GSM relies on a key, shared by the subscriber and the operator,
which is established at the time the contract is signed; the security of Third Generation cellular networks is
based on the same principle. Another example is the Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol,
aimed at providing secure Web access from a mobile device: the servers are authenticated by a certificate
of their public key, delivered by a well-established certification authority.
Both examples show that the driving security concern has been to serve the interest of specific organi-
zations: In the first case, the security system guarantees an operator that only legitimate subscribers can
make use of the communication service it provides; in the second case, it lets an e-business company
claim to its own customers that they are connected to the right Web server and that the message exchange
is protected.
So far, nothing has been proposed for peer-to-peer security in mobile networks. We will show that, far
from being a hurdle, mobility can in fact help security by enabling basic functions such as authentication
and key establishment. We will illustrate the principles of our solution in two scenarios, both in the area
of mobile ad hoc networks.
The first scenario corresponds to situations where an (off-line) authority provides the authorization to
each mobile node to join the network, but it does so only at the initialization of each node; when in each
others’ radio range, nodes mutually authenticate and set up shared keys; this approach allows the nodes
3to join the network at different times (in general, the authority does not even know how many nodes
will eventually be present in the network). An important use of this approach is to secure routing, as the
direct (one-hop) establishment of security associations avoids relying on routing for the establishment of
security associations (i.e., this approach breaks the routing-security interdependence cycle [21, 4]). Another
important application of this approach is to enable the periodic renewal of vital security information (e.g.,
the distribution of hash chain/Merkle tree roots).
In the second scenario, we consider fully self-organized security: in such a setting, there is no central
authority whatsoever, and the establishment (and release) of security associations is purely based on
mutual agreement between users; when they are close to each other, users can activate a secure side
channel between their personal devices to authenticate each other and set up shared keys.
In [12], we have developed this initial idea by quantifying the benefits of mobility and by introducing
a mechanism called “friends” that supports the establishment of security associations even between nodes
that do not meet physically. Here, we further extend this work by proposing protocols that allow the
implementation of our system with both symmetric and public-key cryptography.
The organization of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we survey the related work. In Section 3,
we explain how security associations are created based on encounters and we provide the cryptographic
protocols. In Section 4, we propose several applications of our approach. In Section 5, we study the pace
at which the security associations are created. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 STATE OF THE ART
In [29], Zhou and Haas propose a distributed public-key management service for ad hoc networks in
which the functionality of the central authority is distributed over a subset of nodes through a threshold
cryptography scheme. A more recent proposal by Luo et al. [22] describes a similar approach, that provides
a more fair distribution of the burden by allowing any node to carry a share of the private key of the
service.
4A different technique, proposed by Asokan and Ginzboorg [1] is based on a shared password. In this
approach, nodes willing to establish a secure session must share a prior context (in the example they
“share” a room in which they are located). A fresh password is chosen and shared among users (e.g., it
is written on a blackboard). From this weak password, the users derive a strong key, by making use of a
password-authenticated key exchange.
Another approach, originally designed for the address ownership problem in Mobile IPv6, is described
by Montenegro and Castelluccia in [23] and by O’Shea and Roe in [24]. Their idea is to derive the IP
address of the node from its public key: first, the public key is hashed with a cryptographic hash function,
and then, (part of) the hash value is used as part of the IP address of the node.
In [15], Eschenauer and Gligor propose a random key pre-distribution scheme for sensor networks. Its
operation is briefly described as follows. A random pool of keys is selected from the key space. Each
sensor node receives a random subset of keys from the key pool before deployment. Any two nodes able
to find one common key within their respective subsets can use that key as their shared secret to initiate
communication. This approach is extended by Chan, Perrig and Song in [6].
In [9], we propose a self-organized public-key management system for ad hoc networks, which is similar
to PGP in the sense that users issue certificates for each other based on their personal acquaintances. In
that system, each user maintains a local certificate repository and users’ mutual authentication is performed
through certificate chaining.
To the best of our knowledge, the only research published so far that shows that proximity of devices
can help to set up security associations and to perform authentication is presented in [3, 7]. However,
these proposals deal with the application level security and do not show how the mobility of the nodes can
be used to progressively reinforce the security of the network (e.g., by increasing the security of routing).
Finally, we must mention the works of Grossglauser and Tse [16], and Dubois-Ferriere, Grossglauser
and Vetterli [17, 14]; these papers show that mobility can help to increase the per-user throughput in ad
hoc networks and to disseminate destination location information without incurring any communication
5overhead to the network.
3 MECHANISMS TO ESTABLISH SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS
In this section, we first describe our system model and then we propose the mechanisms for the
establishment of security associations.
3.1 System Model
In this work, we consider and discuss two scenarios: the first assumes the presence of a trusted authority,
whereas the second is fully self-organized.
In the first scenario, we consider an ad hoc network of mobile nodes, controlled by an (off-line) central
authority. This means that the authority controls network membership. We assume that each node has a
unique identity (e.g., assigned to it by the authority). Furthermore, each node holds a certificate signed
to it by the authority that binds the node’s identity and its public key. We also assume that each node
holds a correct public key of the authority, so that it can verify the correctness of the certificates that
other nodes hold.
In the second scenario, we consider an ad hoc network of mobile nodes, where each node represents a
user equipped with a personal mobile device. We assume that each legitimate user has a single device. In
this scenario, we consider that the network is fully self-organized, meaning that there is no infrastructure
(hence no PKI), no central authority, no centralized trusted third party, no central server, and no secret
share dealer, even in the initialization phase. A fundamental assumption is that each node is its own
authority domain.
We assume, in both scenarios, that each node is able to generate cryptographic keys, to check signatures
and, more generally, to accomplish any task required to secure its communications (including to agree on
cryptographic protocols with other nodes).
63.2 Mechanisms
If a node u possesses a certificate signed by the central authority that binds node v with its (v’s) public
key, then we say that there exists a one-way security association from u to v. Two one-way security
associations between nodes u and v (one in each direction) constitute a two-way security association
between the nodes. Equally, if u and v share a secret key kuv, we say that there exists a two-way security
association between u and v.
If public-key cryptography is used, a (two-way) security association between two nodes u and v is
represented by triplet (U, ku, au) at the side of v and triplet (V, kv, av) at the side of u, where U
and V are the names of the users that are associated with nodes u and v, ku and kv are the public keys
of u and v, and au and av are the node addresses of u and v, respectively. Once nodes u and v have
established a security association between them, they can set up secure communication channels that
protect the integrity and confidentiality of the exchanged messages. In fact, for efficiency reasons, u and
v may want to use symmetric key cryptography for the protection of their messages; in this case, they
establish short-term symmetric keys (session keys) using the public keys in the security association. In this
way, the nodes establish short-term symmetric-key security associations, which they can use for efficient
secure routing [19].
Similarly, if symmetric-key cryptography is used, a security association between nodes u and v is
represented by triplet (U, kuv, au) at the side of v and triplet (V, kuv, av) at the side of u, where kuv is a
symmetric key shared by u and v. In the symmetric-key based approach, we consider security associations
to be always two-way; it is not possible to establish a one-way security association1.
The establishment of security associations differs in the authority-based and in the fully self-organized
scenario.
In the authority-based scenario, when two nodes move into the power range of each other, they will
1In practice, the nodes may derive sub-keys from the shared symmetric key of the security association, where each sub-key is used in
one direction only and perhaps only for a specific security service (e.g., either for integrity or for confidentiality, but not for both); this is a
policy issue, out of the scope of our discussion.
7exchange certificates that contain their public keys, and establish a security association.
In the self-organized scenario, when they meet, users are obviously given the possibility to visually
identify each other. The decision to set up a security association between two nodes is based on this
physical encounter. To support this mechanism, we assume that each device is equipped with a short
range connectivity system (e.g., infrared or wire). We call a channel established by this mechanism a
secure side channel. A secure side channel can only be point-to-point and works only when the nodes
are within a “secure range” of each other. We consider this assumption to be realistic, as almost all
personal mobile devices are equipped with infrared interfaces. We assume that the activation of the side
channel is made by both users consciously and simultaneously. When activating the side channel, the users
simultaneously associate the name (or the face) of the other person to the established security association.
This operation is very similar to the exchange of business cards; in fact, it can even be transparently
combined with the exchange of electronic business cards (e.g., exchange of vCards2 between PDAs). If
a user wants to establish a security association with a user-independent device (e.g., a printer), she will
visually identify the device and bind its identity to the context in which the device operates. In this paper,
however, we focus on the establishment of security associations between users’ personal communication
devices. These encounters make it possible for a user to associate a face to a given identity (and to a
given public key), thus solving many of the classical problems of security in distributed systems (e.g.,
impersonation attacks and Sybil attacks [13]).
We assume that an adversary can eavesdrop on all radio links and can manipulate messages in all kinds
of ways. However, the adversary cannot modify messages transmitted over the secure side channel. Note
that we do not require the secure side channel to protect the confidentiality of exchanged information.
Finally, we consider that an adversary can have at his disposal as many fake devices as he wants.
The major difference between the fully self-organized and the authority-based approach stands in user
involvement: In a fully self-organized approach, users need to establish security associations consciously,
2http://www.imc.org/pdi/
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Figure 1. Three mechanisms to create new security associations using (a) the secure side channel, (b) a common friend, and (c1,c2) the
combination of the first two approaches (mechanism (c1) is used only in the public-key based approach).
whereas in the authority-based approach, users do not need to be aware of the establishment of the
security associations, as it is done automatically by their nodes. The use of either of these approaches
strongly depends on the purpose of the network. Typically, the self-organized approach is useful in securing
personal communications on the application level, whereas the authority-based approach is used to secure
networking mechanisms such as routing. We will now address the public-key approach, and then the
symmetric one.
3.2.1 Public-key approach
We focus on the establishment of security associations in the fully self-organized model. In the authority-
based model, two nodes can establish a security association by exchanging their certificates; this is rather
straightforward and we do not detail it further.
Three mechanisms support the establishment of new security associations (Figure 1). Mechanism (a)
is used when two nodes u and v are in the vicinity of each other, and it consists in u and v exchanging
their triplets using the secure side channel. Since the secure side channel ensures the integrity of the
exchanged messages, it precludes the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack. This guarantees a secure
binding between the received user name, public key, and node address. In addition, the user can easily
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encounter. The node can also verify that the other node indeed possesses the private key that belongs to
the received public key by executing a simple challenge-response protocol. Finally, the node address can
be verified against the public key. The verification of the node address against the public key is necessary,
notably for secure routing. One possible solution is to generate the node address from its public key3 by
making use of a technique similar to CAM [24] or SUCV [23]. In this way, node addresses are bound to
public keys in a verifiable way. Note, however, that a malicious node may generate several public keys
and the corresponding node addresses and distribute them to other nodes. Whether this is a problem very
much depends on how the routing protocol is secured; a thorough study of this issue is left for future
work. In the authority-based model, this is not a problem, as the node address is bound to the public key
of the node by the certificate issued by the authority; this removes the need for CAM, SUCV, or similar
mechanisms.
Protocol 1 shows a possible implementation of the direct establishment of security associations.
Protocol 1: Direct Establishment of a Security Association
msg1 (secure side ch.) u → v : au | ξu = h(ru | U | ku | au)
msg2 (secure side ch.) v → u : av | ξv = h(rv | V | kv | av)
msg3 (radio ch.) u → v : ru | U | ku | au
msg4 (radio ch.) v → u : rv | V | kv | av
u : h(rv | V | kv | av) = ξv?; V ?; match(kv, av)?
v : h(ru | U | ku | au) = ξu?; U?; match(ku, au)?
msg5 (radio ch.) u → v : σu(rv | U | V )
msg6 (radio ch.) v → u : σv(ru | V | U)
In Protocol 1, u and v first generate random numbers ru and rv, respectively, and exchange, through the
secure side channel, their addresses au and av and the cryptographic hash values ξu = h(ru | U | ku | au)
3If the node has several public keys, then the node address is generated from a designated one.
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and ξv = h(rv | V | kv | av) of their random numbers and triplets. After this initial exchange, u and v send
messages to each other through the radio interface (since they have obtained each other’s node address in
the first two messages). They exchange their random numbers and triplets, and each of them verifies if
the hash value of the received random number and triplet is equal to the received hash value ξu (or ξv).
If this is the case, they can be sure that they have received the random number and the triplet from the
party with which they exchanged the first messages through the secure side channel. The random numbers
serve as nonces and guarantee the freshness of the subsequent messages. Now, both users can verify if the
received user name corresponds to the other party and both nodes can verify if the received node address
matches the received public key. Finally, the nodes generate and send to each other a signature (σ()) on
the received random number and the user names in order to prove that they possess the private keys that
belong to the exchanged public keys.
With Mechanism (b), two nodes u and v can establish a security association if they have a common
friend f . A simple solution is the following: Since f knows the triplets of both u and v, it can issue (on
request from u and/or v) fresh certificates for both triplets and send them to v and u, respectively, via the
network. Both u and v know the public key of f and they also trust f , therefore they can both verify the
received certificates and will accept the information therein if the verification is successful.
Mechanism (c) is a combination of the friendship relationships and the encounters, and it establishes
only a one-way security association: If nodes u and f are friends and f has obtained the triplet of v
in an encounter with v, then f can issue (on request from u) a fresh certificate for the triplet of v, and
send this certificate to u via the network. Since u knows the public key of f , and also trusts f , she can
verify the received certificate and accept the received triplet if the verification is successful. A two-way
security association between nodes u and v is then established as a combination of two one-way security
associations (from u to v and from v to u).
The protocols corresponding to Mechanisms (b) and (c) are straightforward and we do not detail them.
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3.2.2 Symmetric-key approach
The mechanisms used in the symmetric-key approach are similar; they can be applied to both fully
self-organized and to the authority-controlled networks.
The first mechanism (Figure 1, Mechanism (a)) is the direct establishment through the side channel:
When the nodes are in the vicinity of each other, they can exchange, through the side channel, their
user names and node addresses, and additional data that allow them to compute a shared secret. It is
important to note, however, that in a pure symmetric-key approach, setting up a shared secret between
two parties always requires a confidential channel between them. This means that in this case, the side
channel must ensure not only the integrity but also the confidentiality of messages. Like in the public-key
implementation, the users can verify the received names through personal encounters. The node addresses,
on the other hand, can be verified against the received (and verified) names.
Mechanism (b) supports the establishment of security associations between two nodes u and v via a
common friend f . By assumption, f already has a security association with both u and v, meaning that
it has symmetric keys established with them. In addition, f is trusted by both u and v. Therefore, to
establish a session key between u and v, well-known symmetric-key protocols can be used, where f plays
the role of the trusted (key) server. The session key can be generated either by f who would send it to
both u and v (like in the Kerberos protocol), or by u or v, in which case f would be used as a trusted
relay (like in the Wide-Mouth-Frog protocol [5]).
Finally, Mechanism (c) can be used when two nodes u and v do not have a common friend, or have
a common friend f but do not want f to know their shared secret key. Like in the public-key based
approach, Mechanism (c) combines the first two mechanisms (encounters and friends). Let us assume that
u has a friend f who has already set up a security association with v using the first mechanism. Similarly,
let us assume that v has a friend g who has set up a security association with u using the first mechanism.
Now u and v can set up a security association using f and g by u generating key contribution ku and
sending it to v via g, v generating key contribution kv and sending it to u via f , and then both u and v
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computing a common value kuv from ku and kv. Protocol 2 illustrates this in more detail. In this protocol,
nodes u and v first exchange the names of their friends to be used in the protocol as trusted relays, and
two nonces ru and rv that are used to guarantee the freshness of subsequent messages. Then, u generates
some random key ku and sends it to v via g (msg3 and msg4), and v generates some random key kv and
sends it to u via f (msg3’ and msg4’). Here, dx→y is a direction bit that indicates that the message goes
from x to y (and not from y to x)4. req and rep are bits that indicate that the message is a request to a
friend or a reply from a friend, respectively. We need these bits because every node can play either the
role of a requesting node (u and v) or the role of a friend (f and g), and thus we must indicate not only
that this is a message from x to y but also that x is the requesting node and y is the friend (or vice versa).
Finally, u and v compute a common value kuv from ku and kv using a publicly known pseudo-random
function h (e.g., a hash function).
Protocol 2: Friend-Assisted Establishment of a Security Association
msg1 u → v : f, ru
msg2 v → u : g, rv
msg3 u → g : u, {du→g, req, v, ku, rv}kug
msg4 g → v : g, {dg→v, rep, u, ku, rv}kvg
msg3’ v → f : v, {dv→f , req, u, kv, ru}kvf
msg4’ f → u : f, {df→u, rep, v, kv, ru}kuf
u, v : kuv = h(ku, kv)
An interesting feature of the protocol is that it replaces a single trusted party with two parties trusted
by one entity each. If f and g are not colluding, then none of them has enough information to compute
kuv. In addition, both u and v trust at least one of them for not colluding.
4Note that since messages are always encrypted with a symmetric key kxy , the only ambiguity could be the direction.
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4 APPLICATIONS
In this section, we describe several applications of our approach.
4.1 Key establishment
The mobility-assisted establishment of security associations can be notably used to secure routing, or
simply to protect the confidentiality of user personal communication.
In the first case, this can help to establish sufficient security associations to enable secure routing, thus
by breaking the routing-security interdependence cycle [21]: Security associations cannot be established
over multiple hops as the routing protocol does not operate securely (because security associations are
not established yet).
A conventional solution to the routing-security interdependence includes pre-loading pairwise keys in
all nodes to create all the security associations at the initialization. However, this approach prevents the
insertion of new nodes in the network and is demanding in terms of storage. Other solutions [21] rely on
an on-line key distribution center to initially distribute keys and to handle new nodes. Although effective,
this approach requires a costly initialization phase and the use of complex security protocols. Another
possible solution is to make use of cryptographically verifiable identifiers such as SUCV or CAM [4].
The advantage of this and similar approaches is that all public keys can be simply verified against nodes’
identifiers. The disadvantage is that the nodes cannot change (revoke) their public keys without changing
the identifiers. Other approaches to key distribution may include: network-wide or local broadcast or multi-
cast of public or TESLA [25] keys, either by the servers or by the nodes themselves. These approaches
are very effective, but costly in terms of communication overhead. The main drawback of these schemes
is that even if public keys are distributed to all nodes, routing will not be efficient due to the high cost
of public key cryptography, or at least until symmetric keys are established.
Our mobility-based approach is different in the sense that it enables a flexible setup of security
associations, simplifies the introduction of new nodes in the network, requires at most an off-line authority
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and enables the establishment of secret keys between all pairs of nodes; a drawback is that the establishment
of the security associations requires some time, as detailed in Section 5. Because of this, we see our
approach as a standalone solution in some applications, but also as a complementary solution to other
key management solutions in other applications. Furthermore, as we showed in our previous work [10],
in some scenarios, it is sufficient that only a small percentage (less than 40%) of security associations are
established between the nodes to enable secure routing.
If used to secure users’ personal communication, our mobility-based scheme can enable mutual authen-
tication of users that have already met. Moreover, it can also be used to fuel the creation of certificate
graphs; in that case, authentication can be performed through certificate chaining, as described in [9].
4.2 Periodic distribution of security material
Besides key establishment, mobility can also help to periodically distribute security material. Notably,
it can be used for the distribution of hash chain and Merkle tree roots [26]. Hash chains and Merkle trees
enable authentication of values and are typically used to ensure message freshness and authentication.
They have been used to secure various aspects of routing. Hauser, Przygienda and Tsudik [18] present
an efficient mechanism for the authentication of link state routing updates. Zhang [28] improves this
mechanism and presents a chained Merkle-Witnernitz one-time signature. Hu, Perrig and Johnson [19]
propose a set of efficient security mechanisms for ad hoc networking, which make use of hash chains
and Merkle hash trees. They also use hash chains to efficiently secure routing in ad hoc networks: to
secure distance vector routing updates in SEAD [20] and to prevent malicious changes of hop count in
Ariadne [21]. Finally, hash chains and Merkle hash trees are used to prove encounters between the nodes
in mobile ad hoc networks [8].
All mentioned mechanisms require each node to distribute its hash chain or hash tree roots in an
authentic way to every other node in the network. Moreover, they require the root of a new chain/tree
to be distributed to every node, before the values from the old chain/tree are exhausted. This problem is
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especially important in mobile ad hoc networks, in which broadcasts of roots/chains may be costly, or
infeasible (if only symmetric-key cryptography is used for authentication). We thus propose a mobility-
based approach similar to our key establishment scheme that works as follows.
Each node maintains two hash chains: an active and a pending one. We assume that the root of the
active hash chain/tree has already been distributed; thus the active hash chain/tree can be used for the
security application of interest as described earlier. In contrast, the root of the pending hash chain/tree
has not been distributed yet, and the node has to distribute it to every other node in the network before
the active hash chain/tree runs out of elements. When the root of the pending hash chain/tree has been
distributed, the node can turn the pending hash chain/tree into an active state. At the same time, the node
would generate a new pending hash chain/tree and begin distributing its root. Putting in place the pending
hash chains/trees while using the active ones ensures continuous operation of the system.
In our scheme, the root of the pending hash chain/tree is disseminated in an authentic way when nodes
encounter each other. Together with the root of the pending hash chain/tree, the nodes also disseminate a
time t in the future. The value of t should be estimated in such a way that the active hash chain/tree does
not run out of elements by t and the root of the pending hash chain/tree is distributed to all other nodes
by time t. Then, at t, the pending hash chain/tree becomes active, and a new pending hash chain/tree is
generated; the process is then repeated.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an estimate of the pace at which security associations are created. We assume
that, initially, each node established security associations only with its friends; we further assume that
each node has the same number of friends.
In our analysis, we will observe the following values: the convergence r(t), which represents the fraction
of the security associations established until time t, and the convergence (meeting) time tM , which is the
time needed to establish all the desired security associations. One additional value of interest is the average
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meeting frequency 1/tIM of nodes. Here, tIM is the node inter-meeting time. This value is important for
assessing the frequency of rekeying and the time necessary to perform key revocation.
In our simulations, we make use of the Random Waypoint mobility model and we extend this model
with some new features; we call this new model the Restricted Random Waypoint. In the conventional
Random Waypoint model, a node chooses its destination and its speed towards this destination randomly.
After arriving at the destination, the node pauses for a certain period of time, and then chooses its new
destination and its speed. In the Restricted Random Waypoint model the nodes move in the same way as
in the Random Waypoint model, but their choice of destination points is restricted to a number of fixed
points on the plane with some probability p . This means that with probability p, a node randomly chooses
a point from a finite set of destination points, and with probability 1 − p, it chooses as its destination
a random point on the plane. We call this model the Restricted Random Waypoint mobility model. This
model is closer to reality in the sense that users normally do not randomly choose any point on a plane as
their destination, but they rather move to some meeting points (e.g., meeting rooms, lounges, restaurants)
where communication between users takes place. If p = 1 and if the set of destination points is small, the
convergence time will be very small. On the contrary, if p = 0, we have the standard Random Waypoint
mobility model and the convergence time will be longer.
In this mobility model, two nodes can establish a security association if they are in the security range
of each other (for the fully self-organized network) or in each others’ power range (in the authority based
network). The security range is significantly smaller than the power range of mobile nodes and is the
maximum range that is sufficient for the secure side channel to be set up.
In all simulations, we use the same simulation area, (a 1000m×1000m square) and we set the number
of nodes to n = 100. When the nodes hit the area border, they bounce off under the same angle under
which they hit the border. The node maximum speed is set to 5 m/s (except in one case on Figure 2a,
where it is 20 m/s), and the minimum speed to 1 m/s [27]. The pause time is set to 100 s.
On Figure 2 we observe the convergence rn×s(t) and the node meeting frequency. Figure 2a illustrates
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Figure 2. Restricted Random waypoint simulation results; (a) average convergence, (b) meeting frequency. Here, f is the number of node’s
friends, p is the restriction probability, v is the node speed, and sr is the range within which the nodes can establish security associations.
The results are shown with 95% confidence intervals.
that the friends mechanism speeds up convergence proportionally to the number of friends. Furthermore,
this shows that, as expected, a higher average speed of nodes results in a faster convergence (and therefore
a shorter convergence time). The same figure also illustrates another very intuitive result: The convergence
is faster if the nodes gather at and around meeting points. It is also interesting to observe that, in the
most favorable scenario (in which the security range is 100 m and the network is controlled by a central
authority), 40% of security associations are established in less than 1000 seconds (17 minutes). This is
an important result, given that, as we have shown in [10], this percentage of security associations is
sufficient to support secure routing. Figure 2b shows the node meeting frequency (two nodes), in areas
of various sizes. Here, we observe that the meeting frequency is inversely proportional to the size of
the area. These results are in line with our analysis of the convergence time and meeting frequency of
random walks [11], where we show that the convergence time is proportional to N logN and the meeting
frequency is proportional to 2
N
. Here, N is the size of the area in which the nodes move.
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6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that mobility can help to provide security in mobile networks. We have
illustrated our approach on two application scenarios in the area of mobile ad hoc networks: networks
with an off-line authority and fully self-organized networks. In the first scenario, a direct establishment of
security associations over the (one-hop) radio link solves the well-known security-routing interdependency
problem. In the second scenario, we have shown that the solution is intuitive to the users, as it mimics
real life concepts (physical encounters and friends), and solves some classical problems of security in
distributed systems.
We have shown that our solution works both with public-key and with symmetric cryptography and
we have provided the related protocols. We have studied the pace of establishment of the security
associations under various mobility scenarios. In particular, we have extended the Random Waypoint
model by introducing the concept of meeting points in order to be closer to human behavior. We have
shown that in self-organized scenarios, the set-up of security associations can take several hours, while
in the case of networks controlled by central authorities, this time can be as low as 20 minutes. We have
further shown that the vast majority of the security associations are set up in much shorter time than the
full set of security associations. This is an important observation, as we have recently shown [10] that
secure routing is also possible in networks in which only 40% of security associations are established.
Moreover, if the users are willing to set up security associations, they can decide to move close to people
of their interest.
To the best of our knowledge, this research effort is the first that shows how mobility can help to secure
peer-to-peer mobile networks.
In the future, we plan to study even more realistic and more sophisticated mobility models, including
those with correlated mobility patterns [2]. We will further study how an even incomplete set of security
associations can be exploited to perform crucial security operations. We also intend to further investigate
rekeying and key revocation schemes. Finally, we intend to analyze the burden of the cryptographic
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functions on the processing units, especially in the public-key case.
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